


# CHULA VISTA FIRE DEPARTMENT



# GREEN SHEET

## Informational Summary Report of Serious CVFD Injuries, Illnesses, Accidents, and Near Serious Accidents

### Action Footwear Commercial Structure Fire and Serious Burn Injuries January 25, 2021



### SUMMARY

This informational Summary Report references, on Monday January 25, 2021 at approximately 1740, one Fire Captain and two Firefighters suffered serious burns and one Fire Engineer and one Firefighter suffered orthopedic injuries to lower extremities while working at a commercial structure fire.

Report Completed April 1, 2021

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
## CONDITIONS

Local Weather Station at Living Coast Discovery Center, approximately 1.8 miles NW of the incident at 1800:


- Temperature: 52 degrees F
- Relative Humidity: 64%
- Wind speed: 20-30 mph out of the west
- Wind Gusts: up to 40 mph

## THE BUILDING

The incident structure is located at 655 H Street, on the north side of H Street between Broadway and Oaklawn Avenue approximately 230 feet from that intersection and approximately 150 feet from the nearest fire hydrant located east of the incident on the north side of H Street. The hydrant is located east of the building and was utilized to provide a water supply for the incident. The building is approximately 75' wide by 170' long and located in an area zoned for commercial occupancies. The two-story fire building is flanked by a one-story commercial building to the West (Bravo Exposure) and a parking lot to the East with a one-story commercial structure (Delta Exposure). The involved structure is constructed of cinder block walls and is divided into three occupancies on the first floor and two occupancies on the second floor. The store front on the A side is secured with sliding scissor gate doors inside of two outward opening glass doors. The store was just closing at the time of alarm and the store was doing business as a retail merchant selling casual clothing, shoes, hats, and accessories. There was excessive storage present in all areas of the structure and the building was not sprinklered.








D Side



D Side Double Doors




D Side



A/D Corner



C/D Corner



## Exterior View



B/C Corner



B Side



A Side




A/B Corner

Action Footwear SIRT

Incident Date January 25, 2021





Full size image located in Appendix A.2



Full size image located in Appendix A.1

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## Interior View



Middle Landing towards C/D



Stairwell and landing from C/D ground



Looking at interior C/D corner with abandoned hose





CMU



C/D Corner



Beams



Looking up middle stairwell



Middle Landing towards D



Metal Storage Racks



Metal Racks and CMU

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## Fire Load—Interior Contents

Hat Storage



2nd Floor near center of bldg. looking towards D



2nd floor looking towards C



## Showroom

Back of showroom looking out of A double doors



Showroom middle D doors looking towards A Double doors



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## ORDERED SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

On Monday, January 25, 2021 at approximately 17:41:24, SD ECDC received a 911 call with reports of fire on the roof of a building at 655 H Street in Chula Vista. The first caller provided the specific address of 655 H Street, identified the building as "Action Footwear", and reported fire on the roof. The dispatcher created the incident and resources from CVFD, SDFR, and NCFD were dispatched at approximately 17:42:12 hours. Commercial Structure Response to Action Footwear 655 H Street.

Event details were collected through CAD details, video footage, personnel interviews and radio traffic.




Employee runs downstairs 1740



Employee with first fire extinguisher

Time	Units	Event Details
17:40	Build- ing	Light, wispy smoke from roof
17:41	ECDC	911 call to SD ECDC dispatch reporting roof on fire
17:42	ECDC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Resources from CVFD, SDFR, and NCFD were dispatched</li> <li>1<sup>st</sup> unit enroute, CAD reports roof on fire and occupants exiting</li> <li>Employees attempt to extinguish</li> </ul>
	Build- ing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>First Employee exits D Side showroom doors</li> <li>Consistent dark smoke production from roof</li> </ul>
17:43	E52	E52 CA observes weather and reads MDC, noting that the business is open with occupants evacuating and light smoke reported



The incident time clock was initiated at the time of alarm and the following resources were dispatched:

- (4) Engine Companies
- (2) Battalion Chiefs
- (2) Truck Companies
- (1) US&R Type 1 Heavy Rescue

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Time	Units	Event Details
17:44	B51	B51 on scene of a single-story commercial, heavy smoke showing from the Charlie side, unknown what is on fire, establishing H IC, requesting PD to close down both bounds of H Street
17:45	E51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>E51 at scene; assigned "Fire Attack"</li> <li>E51 observes smoke coming from C/D. Also notes windows with AC units on D side, leading to suspicion the C/D is residential over parking</li> </ul>
	T51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Prior to T51's arrival, B51 assigned T51 to vent, coordinate your efforts with E51, and spot rig in case of going defensive; T51 does not copy</li> <li>T51 announced at scene; B51 repeats assignment of "Vent" but did not repeat coordination and spotting instructions</li> </ul>
17:46	E51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>E51 relays occupant's report of fire on the roof to IC</li> <li>B51 copies report of fire on roof, advises E51 to check C side</li> <li>E51's crew enters Side "D" middle double doors</li> </ul>
	T51	T51 Spots on D side

The IC (B51) made the following assignments:

1st Engine E51 – 17:45:04 on scene and assigned Fire Attack

1st Truck T51 – 17:45:26 on scene and assigned Ventilation

2nd Engine E55 – 17:47:06 on scene and assigned to assist Fire Attack and water supply

3rd Engine SDFR E30 – 17:47:23 on scene and assigned RIC


4th Engine E52– 17:47:52 on scene and assigned primary search

2<sup>nd</sup> BC NCFD B57 – 17:48:48 on scene and assigned a 360 and Safety

2nd Truck NCFD T34 – 17:50:00 on scene and assigned to assist T51 with Ventilation

1st Heavy Rescue US&R53 – 17:52:27 on scene and assigned RIC Group Supervisor with E30

T51 pulled into the east driveway (Delta side) of the involved structure, spotted facing north in the driveway, and placed the aerial ladder to the Delta side roof of the involved occupancy.



1. E51 Entering D side Double Doors



2. E51 FF being directed to fire



3. E51 FF confirming area of fire




4. E51 attempting to open door to stairwell

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Time	Units	Event Details
17:47	E51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>E51's crew is informed by occupant that the door to interior stairwell leading from office to the 2<sup>nd</sup> floor is blocked and are directed to stairwell in C/D corner</li> <li>E51 CA and crew mask up while searching for fire on 1<sup>st</sup> floor</li> </ul>
	E55	E55 at scene; assigned to lay a supply line to E51 and assist E51 with Fire Attack; E55 acknowledges
	E30	E30 at scene; assigned RIC; E30 acknowledges
	E52	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>E52 at scene; assigned primary search (Search Group); E52 acknowledges</li> <li>IC/B51 assigns E52 to pop ceilings after completing primary search</li> </ul>
17:48	E52	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>E52 CA observed grey pressured smoke coming from the frame of the 2<sup>nd</sup> floor Side "D" and thought they may be apartment windows; spoke to an employee who confirmed that nobody lives up there and the area is used for storage</li> <li>E52 considered transitional attack through the Delta windows, but no fire was visible, and windows were not open.</li> <li>E52's crew then enters mid Delta double doors</li> </ul>
	B57	B57 at scene; assigned B57 Safety and a 360
	E51	E51 FF exits the Side "D" mid door and runs to A side to retrieve hose line
 <p>E51 FF returning to E51 for hose line</p>		





E51 established a water supply with assistance from E55. Utilizing a hydrant located east of the incident on the north side of H Street.



Full size image located in Appendix A.3

Time	Units	Event Details	Time	Units	Event Details
17:49	E51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>IC/B51 to Fire Attack E51 - assigning you E55 and advises E52 assigned search and checking for extension</li> <li>E55 FF meets E51 Nozzle FF to discuss building orientation, decide to extend hose line to Delta door in C/D corner based on observed smoke location</li> <li>FA/E51 reports light smoke on the 1<sup>st</sup> floor, making way to the roof</li> <li>C/D Inner door is opened by E51 inside. Noting smoke from doorway</li> <li>E51 CA reports smoke about halfway down the stair, not being pushed down/out</li> </ul>	17:50	E55	E55 Captain enters mid D double door Conti.
	T51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>T51 FF spots 35' extension ladder at mid-point of D wall due to electrical hazards along C side</li> <li>While tying off the ladder, T51 FF speaks to employee and is told fire is on the 2<sup>nd</sup> floor, B side</li> </ul>		E52	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Search/E52 CA confirms all 4 employees are out of the building and determines primary search is complete/clear</li> <li>Search/E52 CA states that the door to the interior stairwell in the office had to be kicked in. Fire is observed rolling on the ceiling and E52 CA orders the door closed for door control</li> <li>Search/E52 advises IC primary search complete/negative, identifies fire in the storage area and need for hose line</li> <li>IC/B51 copies, concurs with line, and makes E52 Division A</li> <li>DivA/E52 requests additional company; IC copies request</li> </ul>
17:50	T34	T34 at scene; assigned to assist ventilation			
	E51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>E55 FF and E51 Nozzle FF decide to double up on the preconnect based on their estimate it was 170' to the C/D corner door</li> <li>E55 FF and E51 Nozzle FF meet with E51 CA and E51 Irons FF at C/D corner door and find an open double door inside a closed outer security door; E51 CA and E51 Irons FF are moving numerous boxes out of the way</li> </ul>			




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Time	Units	Event Details
17:51	E30	C/D outer security door breached by RIC/E30
	B57	B57 passes mid D doors on outside moving towards C/D
	E52	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>DivA/E52 states "it's going pretty good"</li> <li>DivA/E52 says he has E55 and requests becoming "Fire Attack"; B51 assigns E52 to "Fire Attack" with E51 and E55</li> <li>E52 states holding the fire with door control, confirms working fire on 2<sup>nd</sup> floor</li> </ul>
17:52	E51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FA/E51 states interior C/D stairwell, half-way up, little bit of heat, zero visibility, forced D exterior door and E51 FF nozzle stretching line</li> <li>E51 CA requests a second hose line with at least 50' at the door. E55 FF advises first line was 300'. E55 FF and E51 Nozzle FF go to get the extended booster line: E51 Nozzle FF pulls 2 ½" off E51 and E55 FF grabbed the 1 ¾" "Chula Load (dead load)" off E55</li> </ul>
	B51	IC/B51 advises FA/E51 he has E55 and E52, with T51 on roof for ventilation with T34; co-ordinate your efforts with ventilation
	E55	E55 CA splits his crew: leaves E55 EN and E55 FF at the D side C/D door and goes to Div A with himself and the other E55 FF
	E52	E52 EN pulls preconnect to mid D double doors
	B51	IC/B51 requested 2 <sup>nd</sup> alarm; staging at Oak-lawn and H Street



Full size image located in Appendix A.4



Time	Units	Event Details
17:52	USAR53	USAR53 announces at scene; assigned "RIC Conti. Group" Supervisor with E30
	E30	RIC/E30 16' ground ladder to C/D corner 2 <sup>nd</sup> story window
	B57	B57 passes mid D moving towards A

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Time	Units	Event Details
17:53	AMR 414	AMR414 at scene, staged
E51		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>E51 Nozzle FF finished laying the 2 ½" and began advancing the original 1 ¾" into the building. E55 FF connects the 1 ¾" "dead load" to the 2 ½".</li> <li>FA/E51 advises DivA/E52 that E51 is on interior C/D stairwell getting ready to stretch a line, requests E52 location</li> </ul>
E52		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>E52 CA reports 2 personnel from E55 have joined him and a 300' pre-connect is in place</li> <li>E52 suggests staying Div A with E55 and leaving E51 as FA; IC copies</li> </ul>
T51		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>T34 CA face/face with T51 CA, T51 advises T34 to ladder A/B and meet up on roof</li> <li>T51 crew ascends ground ladder to roof from D side</li> </ul>
17:54	AMR Sup 510	AMR Sup 510 assigned MedGroup Sup
E52		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>DivA/E52 CA gives a safety briefing and leader's intent to crew and they begin flowing water upwards and moving up the stairs. Drywall begins falling on them as they advance (drywall is above stairs, not ceiling on second floor)</li> <li>DivA/E52 advises they've started putting water on it from this side</li> <li>DivA/E52 CA recalls 3' visibility in all directions and TIC readings of 200-300 degrees in the immediate vicinity</li> </ul>
T51		T51 Aerial Ladder set to building D side




E52 and E55 attacking the fire



Full size image located in Appendix A.5



Time	Units	Event Details
17:55	E30	RIC places ground ladder raised to D side window above south end of car port
	B51	IC/B51 advises FA/E51 that he will now be Division C to "clean this up", understands he is on C/D corner with E55. E52 will remain Div A
	E51	E51 CA understands the transition to the two divisions and it is cleared up before they ascend with the hose line
	T51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>T51 EN advises T51 CA that aerial ladder is in place on A/D corner of 2<sup>nd</sup> story portion, asks if he should report to roof. T51 states "affirmative"</li> <li>T51 EN reports wind has subsided when he reached top of aerial ladder and he can see entire roof and crew</li> <li>T51 FF performs inspection cut on east roof (white roof), observes little smoke, and identifies rafter direction (N-S or A-C) and roof as panelized</li> </ul>
17:56	E51	DivC/E51 hails ventilation, then IC: no response from either
	B57	B57 passes mid B moving towards C/D; returns and goes in at mid D double doors
		
17:57	B51	IC advised 15 mins into incident; states fire on floor 2 storage unit

Time	Units	Event Details
17:57	E51	E51 FF calls for water from E51 EN on the Conti. states "water coming"
	T51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>T51 FF performs an inspection cut on the west roof after dropping down 2 to 3 feet after crossing the fire wall and observes heavy smoke from hole</li> <li>T51 CA observes large wind turbines "screaming" with heavy smoke from all, fire from one</li> <li>T51 FF observes a large AC unit with heavy smoke and a 12" flame burning the tar next to it</li> <li>Vent/T51 provides roof report: roof is stable, heavy smoke in the attic, ready to perform offensive heat hole. IC/B51 copies, including offensive heat hole, and advises T34 coming to assist</li> </ul>
17:58	B57	B57 exits middle Side D double doors, moves towards C/D corner, then seen walking back towards Side A
	T51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Vent/T51 hails Fire Attack and asks if they're ready for an offensive heat hole; no response from DivC/E51 or DivA/E52</li> <li>T51 CA identifies assumed seat of fire based on wind turbine with fire, calls out roof as panelized with 2x6 rafters, and orders a hole to be cut based on radio traffic from interior crews reporting zero visibility and request for ventilation</li> <li>T51 FF proceeds to AC unit as it is the presumed seat of the fire and cuts a 8' x 8' heat hole</li> </ul>

Time	Units	Event Details	Time	Units	Event Details
17:58 Conti.	E51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>IC/B51 advises DivC/E51 that there is heavy smoke from the roof. DivC/E51 responds that "we are on the 2<sup>nd</sup> floor landing of the interior stairwell with zero visibility and moderate heat, we need a hole over the Charlie/Delta corner"</li> <li>DivC/E51's tactical plan was to figure out where they were, not push, and wait for the hole as they couldn't see</li> <li>E55 FF reports attempting to move many heavy boxes on the 2nd floor landing (C/D) in order to flake out 1<sup>st</sup> hose line. Approximately 70-80' of hose was pulled into the building with about 40' coiled on landing. Landing extended approximately 4' to 5' to a doorway with no door and a large room with many boxes on the other side</li> <li>E55 FF reports he conducted a search of the area of the room near the doorway to the C/D stairs and found a locked door</li> <li>E51 Irons FF states he knew they were operating in the C/D corner and doesn't recall going through or even being aware of an opening in the firewall between the east and west warehouses</li> <li>E51 Irons FF ordered by E51 CA to use hook for room orientation</li> <li>E51 Irons FF does not observe E51 CA using a TI, but believe he had one</li> <li>E51 Nozzle FF performs heat checks and flows water onto observed burning product, but does not locate or apply water on the main body of fire</li> <li>DivC/FA/E51 advises E51 EN they need more pressure in the extended booster. E51 EN copies</li> <li>Div C/E51 is advised by his crew they are on the preconnect, not the booster. DivC/E51 then orders E55 FF to go down to clear kinks</li> </ul>	17:58 Conti.	E51 Conti.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>E55 FF speaks face to face with E51 CA regarding near zero visibility but low heat. E55 FF and EN then exit to change SCBA cylinders in anticipation of relieving E51 when their air runs low</li> </ul>
			17:59	T51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>IC/B51 calls Vent/T51, who responds they copied the traffic and request for a hole in the C/D corner, also reports heavy fire in the attic on the Alpha side</li> <li>IC/B51 asks Vent/T51 to confirm fire A side, Vent/T51 confirms fire in attic A side and a (unintelligible) is above Fire Attack on the A side</li> </ul>
				E52	DivA/E52 asks for confirmation they have fire in the attic. No response
				AMR BLS401	AMR BLS401 at scene
			18:00	E52	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>DivA/E52 and crew are within 5' of the stairwell</li> <li>DivA/E52 CA reports no smoke being pushed downstairs into office, with some rollover overhead (rolling from N to S/C to A)</li> </ul>
			18:01	B6	B6 at scene; assigned to "assist" DivC
				E19	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>E19 at scene; assigned to DivA with E19 EN assigned as STAM</li> <li>E19 CA and FF confused by building orientation and as to who is Div A supervisor. E19 CA believes he is to report to E51 (who is DivC) and sees both entry points are from the parking lot (side D), he determines the parking lot must be Division A</li> </ul>




Time	Units	Event Details
18:01	E31	E31 at scene; assigned to DivC Conti.
	E59	E59 at scene; assigned to report to ICP
18:02	T34	T34 hails Vent/T51 two times, no response
	B51	IC advised 20 mins into incident; IC advises high winds and still trying to make access to the fire
18:03	T29	T29 at scene; ordered to stage on Side A
	T51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>T51 CA and EN observe there is no drop or drywall ceiling and observe flames inside the hole at floor level, toward A/D corner from hole location</li> <li>T51 EN recalls thinking this was a positive development as fire location was undetermined</li> <li>Vent/T51 reports 1<sup>st</sup> offensive heat hole is cut A/B corner, roof is stable. A/B unstable. IC asks for repeat due to chain-saw noise</li> <li>T51 CA moves his crew to the C side (C/D corner of the lower, brown roof) for the second heat hole</li> </ul>
	PIO	CVPIO requests to be added to incident on Command; 15 min eta
18:04	T51	Vent/T51 repeats first offensive heat hole cut with heavy fire in the attic, A/B corner unstable with heavy loads above them (E52), continuing to work in stable C/D corner. IC copies, reminds Vent to exit roof if needed
	T34	T34 hails Vent/T51, no response



Full size image located in Appendix A.6

Time	Units	Event Details
18:04	E51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>DivC/E51 CA hears roof compromise on B side, tells crew to hang tight as they are going to get their hole</li> <li>IC/B51 confirms DivC/E51 copied traffic with Vent/T51 and that A/B or B/C could be unstable. DivC/E51 copied and states he needs the C/D side opened up as they are having a hard time locating the fire in moderate heat, zero visibility</li> </ul>

Time	Units	Event Details
18:05	T51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>T51 FF cuts second hole C side, mid building (C/D corner of brown roof) and reports having to dice and punch through roofing material as it did not louver</li> <li>T51 EN reports the 2<sup>nd</sup> heat hole is larger than the 1<sup>st</sup> and was louvered with the B end down and the D end up (contradicts T51 FF, see above). No ceiling under this hole also</li> <li>T51 CA moves his crew to the C/D corner of the building (white roof) for the third heat hole</li> <li>T51 Climbs over north to south mid span parapet to C/D corner</li> <li>T51 FF observes heavy smoke and 5' to 6' flames from both heat holes while crossing over the fire wall towards the C/D corner. Smoke is heavy from both holes and flames are intermittent</li> </ul>
	E59	E59 notifies DivA/E52 that E59 is assigned to him with a PAR of 3 outside at point of entry and asks what is needed from E59
	B57	B57 makes contact with T34 to confirm they heard T51's radio traffic that the A/B roof is unstable. Recommends they access the roof via T51's aerial
18:06	E54	E54 at scene
	T51	T51 Begins cutting C/D corner heat hole
	E52	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>DivA/E52 CA observes 1<sup>st</sup> hose line not having a positive effect, determines he needs another hose line</li> <li>DivA/E52 directs E59 to bring a 300' 1 3/4" preconnect as a second line (possible Vibralert on E52 CA). E59 copies</li> <li>IC/B51 notes DivA/E52 CA's Vibralert and directs him to pass DivA to E59 and cycle out. DivA/E52 copies</li> </ul>



Time	Units	Event Details
18:07	E31	E31 calls DivC/E51, reports that they've been assigned to him and requests location. DivC/E51 does not respond due to Vent/T51 priority traffic (23:34)
	T51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>T51 CA reports feeling heat through his mask while punching through the 3<sup>rd</sup> hole (C/D corner). Black smoke with flames starting to come through</li> <li>T51 CA reports first two holes are now blowing 20' to 30' flames out</li> <li>T51 completes 3<sup>rd</sup> heat hole C/D corner, observes heavy smoke and fire from 2<sup>nd</sup> heat hole and exits roof</li> <li>Vent/T51 calls IC with priority traffic: coming off the roof due to roof failure in A/B and (unintelligible) B/C (unintelligible) heavy fire. IC/B51 copies the failure in A/B asks for repeat of rest</li> </ul>
		

Action Footwear SIRT

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
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Time	Units	Event Details
18:08	T51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>T51FF reports crawling on hands and knees along Delta wall to make way to aerial</li> <li>T51 FF reports after arriving at aerial, he looks and sees 20' to 30' flame out of all 3 holes, with most fire from B/C hole and heavy smoke laid down across the roof by the wind</li> <li>T51 exiting roof via aerial ladder</li> </ul> 
E51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>DivC/E51 calls IC with priority traffic: "Taking a lot of heat 2<sup>nd</sup> floor, bring a second line up, we are going to make our way back down". IC/B51 asks for unit with priority traffic to go (apparently did not copy). DivC/E51 does not repeat</li> <li>DivC: 2<sup>nd</sup> line interior stairwell, we're taking a lot of heat (30 seconds after previous transmission)</li> <li>DivC/E51 CA says request for 2<sup>nd</sup> line was to cover the withdrawal back and down the stairs</li> <li>DivC/E51 CA hears saws above them and is expecting lift and improved conditions, then hears E51 Nozzle FF stating that he is burning. DivC/E51 not experiencing as much heat from his position and tells the FF to flow the line</li> <li>E51 Irons FF heard saws operating directly above them and a change in interior conditions (zero visibility, blacker smoke, increase in heat) within 5 seconds</li> </ul>	
18:08	E51 Conti.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>E55 FF reports hearing a bang and feeling a wave of pressure, followed by intense heat that forced him down to the ground in the vicinity of the stairs</li> </ul>
E52	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>DivA/E52 CA reports visibility goes to zero and significant heat increase forcing crew to knees</li> <li>DivA/E52 CA determines it's time to get out and directs crew to leave the line. Looks toward C side and sees fire rolling really hard and burning storage racks</li> </ul>	
E59	E59 notifies DivA/E52 that there is fire through the roof	
E31	E31 calls DivC; no response	
18:09	E51	E51 repeats needs a second line 2 <sup>nd</sup> floor right now, DivC, we need a line to the 2 <sup>nd</sup> (radio traffic becomes more urgent)
B51	IC/B51 orders all units to hold traffic, go defensive, back out of structure and prepare for a PAR, asks DivC if he copies. B6 answers as DivC and states he copies (E51 does not acknowledge)	
E52	IC/B51 asks DivA/E52 and E59 if they copy	

Time	Units	Event Details
18:10	E52	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>IC/B51 contacts DivA/E52 to verify they copied to back out and go defensive. DivA/E52 copies</li> <li>IC/B51 contacts DivA/E52 to give a PAR for E52, E19, and E59 when they get outside</li> <li>DivA/E52 contacts IC/B51, reports DivA has a PAR of 7 (3 from E55 minus Engineer, E52 full crew, E59 did not enter). IC copies, asks about E19. DivA replies he never had E19</li> </ul>
	E19	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>E19 was assigned to DivA, but ended up in DivC as due to confusion resulting from their belief that Side D was Side A</li> <li>E19 sees 1 ¾" hose line going into the building via C/D door, takes in the second hose line</li> <li>E19 CA sees fire through the roof and units going defensive prior to E19 crew entering C/D corner door</li> <li>E19 FF2 goes to stairwell to the right of the doorway, observes light haze on first floor, and thick smoke on 2nd floor</li> <li>E19 advances the hose line to the top of stairs, observes E51's hose line, a landing to left, and a room to the right that is flashed over; E19 begins flowing water from the top of the stairway</li> <li>E19 sees exiting E51 and E55 members with TIC, observes temperatures of 600 degrees or less at top of stairs based on lack of color change on TIC screen</li> <li>E19 is told by one of the exiting E51 or E55 members that they cannot see due to mask being glazed over</li> </ul>
	E51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>E55 FF knows conditions have worsened, passes E19 flowing from the landing into the warehouse, and decides to advance along 1st hose line, noting increase in heat as he moves forward</li> <li>E51 Irons FF is separated from the hose line and unsure of stair location, but knew it was time to get out. He hears the E51 CA calling for the 2nd line again</li> </ul>

Time	Units	Event Details
18:10	E51 Conti.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>E51 Irons FF never sees flames, just a glow after he heard the saws above</li> <li>E51 Irons FF thinks this "may be it", but does not activate his EMER button or call a MAYDAY as his captain is still in there and he hasn't heard him call one yet</li> <li>E55 FF hears screaming and sees E51 Nozzle FF "on fire" following the coiled hose line, as he follows a coil away from the stairs, E55 FF brings him back to stairs</li> </ul>



Full size image located in Appendix A.7

## Action Footwear SIRT

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Time	Units	Event Details
18:10 Conti.	E51 Conti.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>E55 FF sees E51 Irons FF next and observes him "smoking", followed by E51 CA. E19 was still flowing water and E55 FF then exits the building with the assistance of E55 EN</li> <li>DivC/E51 CA states that he hears his guys yelling, but that he didn't start to feel panic until he didn't hear them anymore (after the FFs had exited)</li> <li>DivC/E51 CA says he started searching for his crew and encounters numerous boxes; knew he would get burned at this point, created backup plan to go to D side window</li> <li>DivC/E51 CA found hose line and found top of stairs, FFs at top of stairs advise him that all other E51 FFs and E55 FF already have exited. E51 CA exits</li> </ul>
18:11	E19	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>E19 CA confirms seeing both E51 FFs and E55 FF exit building, but was unsure if E51 CA had exited as they did not see anyone exit with a red helmet (E51 CA's helmet was nearly black)</li> <li>E19 CA and B6 discuss missing E51 CA and E19 CA prepares for re-entry to search. E51 CA was located outside the structure</li> <li>IC/B51 contacts E19, no response</li> </ul>
	E51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>E59 Finds E51 Nozzle FF outside of C/D corner POE</li> <li>E51 Nozzle FF moved to work truck where he slumps over the bed</li> <li>DivC/E51 CA unable to see through mask outside, also reports TIC with him but inoperable during incident</li> </ul>

Time	Units	Event Details
18:12	E51	E51 Nozzle FF lay down and PPE removed by E59
	B6	DivC/B6 contacts IC/B51, medical condition with CVFD FF on C/D corner, needs help getting him to ambulance. IC/B51 copies
	B51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>IC/B51 hails AMR413. No response (AMR413 is not assigned)</li> <li>IC/B51 hails DivC/B6. No response</li> <li>IC advised 30 mins into incident</li> </ul>
18:13	AMR 415	AMR415 at scene
	B51	IC requests AMR414 to ICP for 1 victim
18:14	Building	Fire visible from 3rd heat hole C/D corner
	B6	DivC/B6 hails IC, no response
	E59	E59 EN hails E59 CA, no response
	E31	E31 reports staging 6J
	B51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>IC/B51 hails DivC, no response</li> <li>IC requests ECDC notify 01</li> </ul>
18:15	AM-R414	AMR414 patient contact with E51 Nozzle FF
	E31	E31 hails staging, IC/B51 advises E31 staging is on 6K
	B51	IC/B51 hails DivC on 6J twice, no response

Time	Units	Event Details
18:16	E59	E59 EN hails E59, no response
	B51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>IC: requested PIO notification</li> <li>IC: 3rd alarm requested</li> </ul>
	E51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>E51 Nozzle FF on gurney moved to AMR 414 Ambulance</li> <li>DivC/E51 CA gathers crew behind E52 to assess condition, asks who is assigned "Medical", and then decides entire crew is going to UCSD Medical Center</li> <li>DivC/E51 CA still looking for "Medical" to advise them that 3 from E51 are going to UCSD Medical Center. E51 CA then sees the Fire Chief and advises him</li> </ul>
18:18	AMR 414	AMR414 departs scene with E51 Nozzle FF
	PIO	CVPIO at scene
18:20	AMR BLS401	AMR BLS401 at scene
18:21	B51	IC: requested SDGE electric/gas and fire investigators
18:23	B51	IC advised 40 mins into incident
18:29	AMR 415	AMR415 patient contact with E51 CA and E51 Irons FF
18:33	B51	IC advised 50 mins into incident
18:35	AMR 414	AMR414 arrives at UCSD
18:38	AMR 415	AMR415 departs scene with E51 CA and E51 Irons FF
18:42	B51	IC advised 60 mins into incident
18:52	B51	IC advised 70 mins into incident
18:58	AMR 415	AMR415 arrived UCSD with E51 CA and E51 Irons FF



Time	Units	Event Details
19:02	B51	IC advised 80 mins into incident; IC reports heavy fire from building of origin
19:07	E51	E51 CA and E51 Nozzle FF in UCSD Medical Center ER, E51 Irons FF in trauma and then ICU
19:11	AMR BLS401	AMR BLS401 patient contact with E55 FF
19:12	B51	IC advised 90 mins into incident
19:13	B51	IC: Bldg still well involved; heavy wind tampering operations
19:16	AMR BLS401	AMR BLS401 departs scene for Sharp Memorial with E55 FF
19:22	B51	IC advised 1hr 50mins into incident
19:37	AMR BLS401	AMR BLS401 arrived at Sharp Memorial with E55 FF
19:43	B51	IC advised 2 hours into incident
20:20	B51	IC: Knock Down on fire; stop timer; moving units thru rehab and releasing
1:32	B51	IC terminated

Action Footwear SIRT

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## INJURIES AND DAMAGED EQUIPMENT

A total of 5 firefighters were injured. Three members suffered injuries ranging from partial thickness to full thickness burns, and two members suffered lower extremity injuries.


All PPE from the members with burn injuries was collected, cataloged, inspected, and sent to Honeywell for testing. Findings will be provided in a later report. The PPE of the burned personnel shows thermal damage from an extended exposure to radiant heat over head. There is no evidence of direct flame impingement to the gear.



Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) and facepieces were inspected by Scott Fire and Safety. The Scott technicians deemed all equipment, with exception of the cylinders, damaged beyond repair and taken out of service.



Multiple tools, including firehose, were either unrecoverable or significantly damaged to include 6 rolls of 1 ¾ fire hose and 1 nozzle.



Four Thermal Imaging Cameras were utilized at the fire. Two TIC's malfunctioned at scene and were sent to Bullard for further diagnostic testing. E55's camera had been malfunctioning prior to the fire and the Bullard service technicians recommended several repairs once tested. E51's TIC was tested by the Bullard service technicians and the product performed to the design specifications. In addition, the quality team also conducted high temperature tests with the same results, the imager performed to specification.



Rank	Injuries
E51 Captain	2nd degree burns — 5% BSA
E51 FFPM	2nd degree burns — 6% BSA
E51 FF	3rd degree burns — 30% BSA
E59 Engineer	Ankle
E55 FF	Knee



## SAFETY ISSUES FOR REVIEW

Review the following Rules, Policies, and Guidelines and ensure department members understand the fire-ground implications of not following these Rules, Policies, and Guidelines.

- IAFC Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival
- IAFC The Incident Commander's Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety
- CVFD SOG 1.12 Staff Recall
- CVFD SOG 1.14 Unassigned Personnel Response to Emergency Incidents
- CVFD SOG 2.5 Fireground Factors
- CVFD SOG 2.6 Tactical Priorities - General
- CVFD SOG 2.8 Tactical Priorities for Offensive Fire Control
- CVFD SOG 2.12 Tactical Priorities – Tactical Support Activities
- CVFD SOG 2.13 Tactical Priorities – Additional Resources
- CVFD SOG 2.16 Building Identification
- CVFD SOG 10.1 Rules of Engagement
- CVFD SOG 10.2 Risk Management
- CVFD SOG 10.5 Fireground Safety
- CVFD SOG 11.1 Radio Reports
- CVFD Ops Bulletin 13-03 10 Minute Incident Timer
- CVFD Safety Bulletin 12-002 ID and Management of Life Hazard Zones
- SD County Operational Area Policy #2-A Personnel Identification Methods
- SD County Operational Area Policy #3-A Communication Traffic Modes
- SD County Operational Area Policy #4-A Emergency Channel Usage
- SD County Operational Area Policy #5-A Fireground Accountability
- Review “Mayday” procedures
- Review fire ground survival procedures
- Review apparatus spotting and placement
- Review NFPA regarding PPE inspection, retirement, etc..... which includes all issued turnout-coats, turnout-pants, turnout-boots, firefighting helmets, firefighting hoods, and firefighting gloves.



## LESSONS LEARNED

**Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)** – Wearing all appropriate Department approved PPE (turnout coats, turnout pants, turnout boots, firefighting helmets, firefighting hoods, firefighting gloves) as intended will save lives and reduce risk of injury. Firefighters are entering the most dangerous structural fires to date and PPE is being pushed to its failure point. The department should establish a method to periodically inspect department issued safety equipment. Without inspections, alterations, deterioration and use of equipment purchased outside of the department's process may become a common problem.

**Reinforce Foundational Firefighting Education and Skillsets** – CVFD operations are based on fundamental fire-ground tactics designed to be proactive to incident potential. Continue to emphasize that firefighting basics are being accomplished at every incident which includes, but are not limited to, methodical hose lays, developing supply lines, additional ground ladders, organized ventilation operations, forcible entry, and establishing a medical component early. Build on the basic firefighting and command fundamentals by constantly challenging your process with increased scope and complexity of training scenarios or simulations. Fire flow path, fire dynamics and its effect on fires should be a part of regular training for all ranks of the department, its effect on all components of fire ground operations – from tactical to command- is a key component of modern firefighter recurrent training. The Deputy Chief and Battalion Chiefs must have an active role in Battalion training. Firefighting skills should be included in all Battalion training and Engine/Truck Company drills. Frequent training on and following SOG's on the fireground is key for incident scene success.

### **Self-Survival Skills are Critical**

- Firefighters need to activate their PASS or EMER when lost or disoriented
- Firefighters must stay together
- Command must identify who's lost, injured, or disoriented and from what company
- Firefighters must follow SOG's when in trouble

**Coordinated Fire Attack** - Firefighters commonly use ventilation in conjunction with suppression efforts to improve the firefighting environment, increase the survivability of trapped occupants, and reduce property damage. When uncoordinated with suppression in a ventilation limited environment, or when suppression is not effective due to obstructions or water flow issues, ventilation efforts may lead to increased fire growth and spread, potentially inducing a flashover or backdraft. Firefighters must ensure that ventilation is coordinated with suppression efforts and that the tactics are deemed effective by both interior and exterior crews with visual cues showing improvement of conditions. The tactics must be continually evaluated to determine their effectiveness on the overall operations and incident priorities.

**Accountability** - Operating in a large commercial building with low or no visibility is extremely dangerous. Crews must stay together. A strong accountability system is necessary on all incidents. The Incident Commander must maintain an accurate account of all firefighters operating on the fireground. Detailed accountability of all members before, during, and after the incident is critical to determining the scope of a firefighter emergency and ensuring firefighter safety. During a catastrophic event, the smallest details become extremely important, such as the accuracy of Telestaff rosters, crew logging on MDC's, apparatus personnel accountability tags, company identifying helmet passports, database inputted radio identifiers, command situation status/resource status, and Personal Accountability Report (PAR) procedures.

**Occupancy Identification**— Recognize, analyze, and base strategic decisions on the potential hazards associated with large/ventilation limited occupancies. The hazards of these large structures continue to evolve and change rapidly. Coordination between Fire Prevention and Operations is essential to stay current on trends in the industry that pose operational risks to CVFD members. Continually study Blue Sheets, Green Sheets, After Action Review Reports (AARR), and Line-of-Duty Death (LODD) Reports to gain knowledge on associated risks.

**Incident Organization**— “Organize early” During developing incidents, it is essential to assign Division/Group Supervisors for span of control, accountability, safety, and “ground truth” situational awareness. Division/Group supervision assists in defining roles and clearing up communication, especially during “Mayday” incidents. Consideration should be given to clearly defining who is in charge when multiple companies are entering a single point of entry. The use of Divisions/Groups in the Incident Command organization provides a standard system to divide the incident scene into smaller manageable components. Whenever two resources are assigned to the same geographic area or function at an incident, one of the officers shall be placed in command of that geographic area or function (Division/Group Supervisor).

**The Incident Command Staff**— A large command staff is needed to manage an incident that is escalating. An Incident Commander and support staff working together as a command team will be able to manage any incident. Command Officers must be assigned to manage divisions/groups early in offensive strategies. Safety Officers should provide timely and accurate information of hazards and mitigations on the fireground. Changes to the plan based on hazard identification should be immediately communicated to all operational personnel and the IC. Safety Officers should also constantly help to validate the strategic plan (Offensive vs Defensive operations) based on continual evaluation of hazards and situational awareness. All levels in the Incident Command System must participate in frequent simulations.

**Radio Discipline**— Maintain radio discipline during all emergency incidents, with particular attention to maintaining a clear tactical channel during all phases of the Incident. Communications are key and unnecessary communications must be eliminated on the fireground.

**Emergency Evacuation**— Due to the inherent dynamic nature of firefighting, a continually evaluated and communicated plan for rapid egress (evacuation) is essential when working at an incident. Recognize, communicate, and mitigate potential dangers of narrow or blocked aiseways, stacked contents, or excessive storage. Limiting entry and assigning companies to clear the egress route should be considered. Develop company SOG’s for emergency evacuation from the interior as well as the exterior or roof.

**Crew Resource Management (CRM)**— “If you see something, say something!” CRM enhances communication, increases situational awareness, strengthens decision-making, and improves teamwork. Just prior to the significant increase in heat, a member on the interior notified a company officer that there was a dramatic change in conditions toward the rear of the building. Emphasize that all members operating at an incident have the ability and responsibility to serve as a lookout for others.



**Medical Unit**— The department should establish a medical and rehabilitation unit at all greater alarm fires. Utilization of a medical unit for greater alarm incidents with corresponding care guidelines and policies will improve all facets of personnel health and safety at incidents.

**Incident Reviews (AAR)**- A written incident review process after incidents should be mandatory in order to assist in correction, documentation and positive reinforcement of significant findings and lessons learned. Implementing mandatory incident tailboard reviews, after action reviews and serious incident review teams should be based on pre-determined criteria for all working incidents.

**Pre-Plans**—Fire companies need to pre-plan occupancies within their first due response areas. CVFD should develop comprehensive fire risk management plans to:

- identify low, medium, and high-hazard occupancies
- allocate resources according to identified risks
- develop operating procedures that respond to specific risks.

A fire risk management plan, properly implemented, would have identified the hazards associated with the size, type, and configuration of the fuel load and the large open spaces that existed at the Action Footwear Store.

**Thermal Imaging Cameras**—All companies operating on the fireground should have a Thermal Imaging Camera (TIC). Firefighter Life Safety Initiative No. 8 (one of the 16 Life Safety Initiatives from EveryoneGoesHome.com) states: Utilize available technology wherever it can produce higher levels of health and safety. TICs are most effective when operated by firefighters who are well trained in their use. TICs offer an efficiency for fire ground tasks such as scene size-up, hot spot identification, search and rescue, and hazard detection. TICs make it possible for firefighters to anticipate fire growth, the direction of travel, convection current dangers, and the risk of thermal insult. Despite access to three-layer PPE gear, today's firefighters cannot rely solely on protective equipment. The fast-moving nature of fires paired with overconfidence in high-performance PPE can be a dangerous combination. The high thermal protection of modern turnout gear means that an interior firefighter may not recognize thermal insult before it is far too late. With fires that change in an instant and gear that protects until its breaking point, it is more important than ever for firefighters to understand modern fire behavior and make more informed decisions faster. Information provided by TICs allows for greater situational awareness and understanding and can assist safer "Go/No Go" decision making and more precise stream placement. The use of thermal imagers is required to meet the demands of the modern fire environment.

## APPENDIX

### Appendix A

- A.1 MAP 1—Action Footwear Main Floor
- A.2 MAP 2—Action Footwear Second Floor
- A.3 MAP 3—Action Footwear Main Floor E51
- A.4 MAP 4— Action Footwear Main Floor E51/E52 17:52—17:58
- A.5 MAP 5— Action Footwear Second Floor 17:54—17:58
- A.6 MAP 6— Ventilation Operations (ROOF) T51
- A.7 MAP 7—Action Footwear Main Floor 18:09—18:12

### Appendix B

- B.1 Blue Sheet

A.1




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## A.2




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## A.3




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## A.4



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
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## A.5

## MAP 5— ACTION FOOTWEAR (SECOND FLOOR)



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## A.6

## MAP 6— Ventilation Operations (ROOF) T51




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## A.7



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B.1

## **Preliminary Summary Report of Serious or Near Serious Injuries, Illness and Accidents**



### **Chula Vista Fire Department**

**Action Footwear Fire**

**655 H Street**

**Monday, January 25, 2021**

### **SUMMARY**

On Monday, January 25, 2021 at 1740 hours the Chula Vista Fire Department responded to a commercial structure fire at Action Footwear 655 H Street, Chula Vista, CA 91910.

Upon arrival Engine 51 found the business open and occupied with smoke showing from the building. The building was two story block wall construction and approximately 10,000 square feet. They evacuated the occupants and then stretched hose lines to attack the fire and ensure no further occupants were inside.

While inside and on floor 2 of the building, strong exterior winds increased the fire's intensity and created a super-heated environment. This caused 2nd degree burns to three firefighters ranging from 5% to 20% of their bodies. All three firefighters were transported via ambulance to the Burn Center/Trauma Center. Two firefighters with approximately 5% burns were treated and released early Tuesday morning. The third firefighter with 20% burns will remain in the Burn Unit ICU for approximately 3-5 days. A fourth firefighter sustained a severe ankle injury and was transported to a Trauma Center, treated, and released late Monday night.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS**

None at this time. Green sheet to follow.

*This Preliminary Summary Report is intended as an aid in accident prevention and to provide factual information. To that end, it is published and distributed within a short time frame. Information contained within may be subject to revision as further investigation is conducted, and other reports and/or documents are received.*